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Abstract
In his paper ‘Are we ever aware of concepts? A critical question for the Global Neuronal Workspace, Integrated Information,
and Attended Intermediate-Level Representation theories of consciousness’ (2015, this journal), Kemmerer defends a con-
servative account of consciousness, according to which concepts and thoughts do not characterize the contents of con-
sciousness, and then uses that account to argue against both the Global Neuronal Workspace theory of consciousness and
Integrated Information Theory of Consciousness, and as a point in favour of Prinz’s Attended Intermediate-level
Representations theory. We argue that there are a number of respects in which the contrast between conservative and lib-
eral conceptions of the admissible contents of consciousness is more complex than Kemmerer’s discussion suggests. We
then consider Kemmerer’s case for conservatism, arguing that it lumbers liberals with commitments that they need not –
and in our view should not – endorse. We also argue that Kemmerer’s attempt to use his case for conservatism against the
Global Neuronal Workspace and Integrated Information theories of consciousness on the one hand, and as a point in favour
of Prinz’s Attended Intermediate Representations theory on the other hand, is problematic. Finally, we consider
Kemmerer’s overall strategy of using an account of the admissible contents of consciousness to evaluate theories of con-
sciousness, and suggest that here too there are complications that Kemmerer’s discussion overlooks.
Key words: contents of consciousness; Global Neuronal Workspace Theory; Integrated Information Theory; Attended
Intermediate-Level Representations Theory; concepts; conscious thoughts
Introduction
When it comes to consciousness we are not lacking in grand
theories. From accounts that appeal to quantum-level activity
on the one hand to accounts that appeal to the functional and
representational properties of personal-level mental states on
the other hand, there is no shortage of proposals for what dis-
tinguishes conscious activity from unconscious activity. What
we are lacking, rather, are constraints that can be used to evalu-
ate such accounts.
In his stimulating paper, Kemmerer argues that one source
of such constraints may be found by considering the kinds of
contents that can figure in consciousness. Mental states have
content insofar as they represent things as being some way, but
consciousness is limited in the kinds of things it can represent –
only some kinds of contents are ‘consciously admissible’
(Hawley and Macpherson 2011). If we knew what kinds of con-
tents can – or, as the case may be, cannot – figure in conscious-
ness, then we could use that information to decide between
competing accounts of consciousness. An acceptable theory of
consciousness ought to be consistent with an account of the ad-
missible contents of consciousness, and ideally it ought to ex-
plain why certain types of contents can be conscious whereas
others cannot (Bayne 2009; Bayne and Montague 2011).
In short, we are sympathetic to Kemmerer’s attempt to use
an account of the admissible contents of consciousness to con-
strain the evaluation of theories of consciousness. However, we
find ourselves at odds with Kemmerer’s execution of this
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strategy. Kemmerer endorses a conservative account of the con-
tents of consciousness according to which concepts and the
thoughts into which they enter are never conscious, whereas
we are rather more sympathetic to a liberal conception of the
contents of consciousness, according to which concepts and
thoughts are routinely conscious. Roughly speaking, conserva-
tives take consciousness to be purely non-conceptual, whereas
liberals regard the contents of consciousness as dependent on
both conceptual and non-conceptual forms of representation.
Suppose that we are looking at a banana in ordinary conditions.
Conservatives take your visual experience to be exhausted by
an awareness of the object’s shape, texture, colour, and so on,
whereas liberals allow that you might consciously experience it
as a banana, as a fruit and perhaps even as edible.
Liberalism versus conservatism
Like their political counterparts, the contrast between ‘liberal’
and ‘conservative’ accounts of the admissible contents of con-
sciousness is elastic, and the labels are best thought of as pick-
ing out lose collections of views held together by relations of
family resemblance rather than monolithic positions. This sec-
tion identifies some of the main forms that liberalism can take,
and thus reveals certain respects in which Kemmerer’s discus-
sion overlooks a number of important distinctions.
In giving an account of where to draw the line between liber-
alism and conservatism one must attend to three issues. Firstly,
one must ask whether the account in question focuses on the
role of concepts in consciousness or whether it focuses on the
role of thoughts in consciousness. One kind of conservative
denies only that thoughts ever figure in consciousness, whereas
another (and bolder) kind of conservative denies that concepts
ever figure in consciousness. (We consider below what it is for
something to ‘figure’ in consciousness.)
This distinction is important, for there is nothing obviously
incoherent in holding that concepts can figure in consciousness
while denying that thoughts can. (It is, of course, incoherent to
suppose that thoughts can figure in consciousness while deny-
ing that concepts can, for concepts are the constituents
of thought.) Suppose – as many theorists do – that ‘high-level’
perception or ‘seeing as’ involves the deployment of concepts.
Those who hold this view think that recognizing Barack Obama
as Barack Obama requires the deployment of the singular con-
cept <Barack Obama> and that recognizing a barred owl as a
barred owl requires the deployment of the general concept
<barred owl>. The claim that concepts can figure in perceptual
content is controversial (see e.g. Byrne 2005; Fodor 2007;
Woodruff-Smith 2011) and we are not here endorsing it. Our
point is only that the existence of such a view indicates that we
need to distinguish the debate about the conscious admissibility
of conceptual content from the debate about the conscious ad-
missibility of thought content.
The second issue that needs to be considered concerns what
it means for a concept/thought to ‘figure in consciousness’.
Kemmerer uses different locutions to explicate this idea. In one
place, he characterizes conservatives as committed to the claim
that ‘we are never aware of concepts per se’ (2015: 2), in another
place he characterizes the debate in terms of whether ‘concepts
have intrinsic qualia’ (2015: 2), and in yet another place he de-
scribes conservatism as the view that ‘thoughts are always hid-
den from awareness’ (2015: 4).
Kemmerer’s use of different locutions here is understand-
able, for there is no canonical articulation of the ‘figuring in’
relation, and different theorists operate with different concep-
tions of it (see Bayne and Montague 2011). However, it is also
problematic, for the three locutions that Kemmerer employs are
not co-extensive, and it is possible that concepts/thoughts can
figure in consciousness in some of these senses but not others.
Furthermore, at least one of the theorists who Kemmerer re-
gards as an arch-conservative allows that concepts can figure in
consciousness in one of these senses:
. . . we can only be aware of the contents of our thoughts if they’re
linked with pronunciation. So if we haven’t yet turned a thought
into words, we’re only aware at best of thinking going on, not of
exactly what the thought is. (Jackendoff 2012: 90–91)
Jackendoff denies that we are ever directly aware of our
thoughts, but he proposes that thoughts can figure in con-
sciousness indirectly by being suitably encoded in sensory con-
tent such as auditory representations of pronunciation (we
return to this proposal below). So either the conservative must
allow that we can be aware of the contents of our thoughts or
Jackendoff is no conservative.
The third issue that needs to be recognized here concerns
the possibility of non-phenomenal forms of consciousness.
[Phenomenal consciousness is notoriously hard to define, but
one promising approach is to understand phenomenal con-
sciousness as the kind of consciousness that gives rise to the
so-called ‘hard problem’ (Bayne 2009; Kriegel 2009; Carruthers
and Veillet 2011; McClelland forthcoming); non-phenomenal va-
rieties of consciousness do not seem to present this distinctive
explanatory quandary.] One kind of conservative denies that
concepts/thoughts can figure in phenomenal consciousness but
allows that they can figure in some other kind of consciousness
(e.g. access consciousness), whereas another kind of conserva-
tive denies that concepts/thoughts figure in any kind of
consciousness.
The background issue here is whether ‘consciousness’ and
‘awareness’ are labels for the same phenomenon, or whether
these terms have distinct referents. Kemmerer takes these
terms to be synonyms, but many theorists distinguish them, or
at least distinguish phenomenal consciousness from one or
more non-phenomenal forms of consciousness (a move that es-
sentially amounts to the same thing). This distinction is often
(implicitly) motivated by the desire to accommodate a sense in
which concepts and thoughts are conscious, together with
doubts about whether concepts/thoughts can figure in phenom-
enal consciousness. This motivation is clearly evident in the fol-
lowing passage:
There are propositional attitudes, and we are sometimes noninfer-
entially conscious about our attitudinal states. But such con-
sciousness does not feel like anything. A propositional attitude
and consciousness about that attitude have no phenomenological
properties . . . There are different sorts of states we call “conscious
states,” and the most important sorts are not like having sensa-
tions. (Nelkin 1989: 430)
Nelkin is a conservative insofar as he denies that thoughts
are phenomenally conscious, but he doesn’t deny that thoughts
are conscious in some sense of the term – indeed, he insists on
this point (see also Lormand 1996).
The upshot of these considerations is that we need to distin-
guish various strands of conservativism. Radical conservatives
claim that neither thoughts nor concepts figure in consciousness
in any sense of ‘figuring’ or of ‘consciousness’. Although
Kemmerer appears to be a radical conservative most
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conservatives are rather less radical; in fact, we know of no other
theorist who advocates the radical form of conservatism en-
dorsed by Kemmerer. Carruthers denies that non-sensory
thoughts figure in consciousness but accepts there is a sense in
which perceptual concepts do (2015); Jackendoff (2012) and Prinz
(2012) both deny that concepts or thoughts directly figure in con-
sciousness but they accept that they can indirectly figure in con-
sciousness; and although Nelkin (1989) and Lormand (1996) deny
that concepts/thoughts are ever phenomenally conscious, they
take them to be conscious in some non-phenomenal sense of the
term. All of these individuals are card-carrying conservatives, yet
they each resist the radical conservatism that Kemmerer appears
to endorse. We will use the label ‘moderate conservatism’ for any
form of conservatism that stops short of the radical form.
In our view, moderate conservatism is far more plausible
than its radical sibling. Indeed, we confess that we find it diffi-
cult to take radical conservatism seriously, for it seems obvious
to us that there’s a sense in which our thoughts are often con-
scious. How can we express our thoughts if they are always un-
conscious? It also seems obvious to us that we are often
perceptually aware of objects and events as instantiating high-
level properties (i.e. properties of the kind that concepts might
be needed to represent). Suppose that you and I are both talking
with Barack Obama, but only you are aware of the identity of
the person with whom we’re conversing. Isn’t it exceedingly
plausible to suppose that the concept of <Barack Obama> fig-
ures in your experience whereas it fails to figure in mine?
Kemmerer’s case for conservatism
As we read him, Kemmerer defends the conservative view by
presenting three arguments against liberalism. We challenge
each of these arguments before suggesting an overall diagnosis
of where Kemmerer is off the mark.
The objection from generality
Kemmerer’s first objection trades on ‘ . . . the remarkable specif-
icity of experiences and the equally remarkable generality of
concepts’ (2015: 4). We might put his worry in terms of the fol-
lowing argument:
(1) The contents of consciousness are purely specific.
(2) Concepts have purely general content.
(C) So, concepts cannot figure in the contents of consciousness.
The argument is valid, so the only question is whether its
premises are true. But in order to address that question, we
must first ask what the premises mean, for it is not at all clear
what the contrast between the ‘specificity of consciousness’
and the ‘generality of concepts’ amounts to. Unfortunately,
Kemmerer doesn’t provide an analysis of these terms, so we are
left with the task of reconstructing the distinction on his behalf.
We examine two ways of reading the distinction, both of which
tally with certain claims Kemmerer makes. We argue that on
neither of these readings is the argument convincing.
(i) Types versus tokens
The general/specific distinction can be understood as a distinc-
tion between types and tokens, where types are kinds and to-
kens are particular examples of that kind. For instance, goats
are a type of object and your pet goat Billy is a token of that
type. Similarly, hairiness is a type and Billy’s hairiness is a par-
ticular token of that type. Our concept <goat> does not just re-
fer to some particular goat like Billy, but rather refers to the type
to which all goats belong. Similarly, our concept <hairiness> is
not attached to a specific instance of hairiness but rather refers
to the property exemplified by all hairy things. This is what al-
lows us to think about goats and hairiness in abstraction, with-
out having to think about any specific goat or specific case of
hairiness.
What does this mean for the prospects of concepts figuring
in consciousness? Kemmerer (2015: 4) endorses Jackendoff’s
claim that ‘ . . . everything you perceive is a particular individ-
ual . . . you can’t perceive categories . . . ’. The idea seems to be
that you can only ever be conscious of the token goat (or goats)
with which you are presented. You cannot, on this account, be
conscious of goats in general, or of some unspecified goat, or of
goatness in abstraction. Kemmerer goes on to make a parallel
point regarding properties. In response to Dehaene’s claim that
we experience Da Vinci’s Mona Lisa as a ‘seductive Italian
woman’, Kemmerer states that ‘ . . . it is extremely hard to imag-
ine how anyone could directly experience seductiveness in
some sort of general, all-encompassing sense’ (2015: 5). The
claim here is that we can only experience particular tokens of
properties with which we are presented. On this reading,
Kemmerer is arguing:
(1i) Consciousness only ever represents tokens.
(2i) Concepts always represent types.
(C) So, concepts cannot figure in the contents of consciousness.
Although (1i) has some intuitive force, it is hotly contested
whether consciousness really does represent particular tokens.
Some theorists argue that perceptual content is general, in the
sense that one’s perceptual experience of a tree as green is not
essentially about that specific tree or that specific instance of
greenness (Davies 1992; McGinn 1997; Horgan and Tienson
2002). Our perceptual experience represents the presence of an
object before us at such-and-such a distance, but arguably it
does not pick out any particular tree as opposed to any other tree
of exactly the same description. Experience represents an object
as being of the green type but does not pick out this tree’s green-
ness as opposed to some other token of the same shade of
green. On this view, the contents of perception can be unat-
tached to specific tokens in much the same way as the contents
of thought. This is not to say that there is no difference between
the contents of thought and those of perception, it is just to say
that the distinction between representing types and represent-
ing tokens does not mark that difference.
There are, however, accounts of perceptual content that
paint (1i) in a much more positive light. According to some theo-
rists, perceptual content is singular or object-involving (Evans
1982; McDowell 1986; Martin 2002). On such views, the contents
of your visual experience when looking at a goat involve the
particular goat (Billy) that you are looking at. Had you been look-
ing at an indiscriminable but numerically distinct goat (Bobby)
then the contents of your visual experience would have been
likewise distinct. On this view, perceptual experience is com-
mitted, as it were, to the existence of the token individual at
which one is looking.
But although embracing the singular view of perception
would allow Kemmerer to defend (1i), the very existence of gen-
eral accounts means that Kemmerer is not entitled to take (1i)
for granted. Furthermore, there are passages in Kemmerer’s dis-
cussion (e.g. 2015: 4) that seems to suggest that he himself
thinks of perceptual content in general rather than singular
terms.
What about (2i)? Although there is certainly a use of the term
‘concept’ according to which concepts refer only to general
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properties – properties that can, in principle at least, be instanti-
ated by more than one object – this use of ‘concept’ is not the
one that Kemmerer has in mind, for he recognizes the existence
of ‘ . . . concepts for one-of-a-kind entities, like the well-known
people and places that are represented by . . . ATL cells . . . ’
(2015: 4). We might call such concepts ‘singular concepts’ in or-
der to distinguish them from ‘general concepts’ such as
<green>, <goat>, and <gaiety>. You might, for instance, have
a singular concept for your pet goat Billy. Such a concept is ap-
propriately applied to Billy independently of how he appears to
you, and is not appropriately applied to anything other than
Billy. Insofar as Kemmerer recognizes the existence of singular
concepts he cannot also embrace (2i).
A deeper objection to (2i) is that it misconstrues how concep-
tual representation works. Consider the concept <seductive>.
This is a concept of a type, but when you apply this concept you
place a particular token under that type. In such cases, there is
a clear sense in which you are conceptually representing a to-
ken, so it is wrong to say the concepts only ever represent types.
Kemmerer may well be right that when we look at the Mona Lisa
we do not ‘ . . . directly experience seductiveness in some sort of
general, all-encompassing sense’ (2015: 5). But rather than
experiencing seductiveness itself perhaps we simply experience
the Mona Lisa’s seductiveness. That is, we conceptually represent
a particular token of that type. If this sounds unintuitive, con-
sider the fact that although we can never experience forms, col-
ours, or textures in a ‘general, all-encompassing sense’, it is
beyond doubt that we experience the form, colour, and texture
of the Mona Lisa. Overall, neither premise of this formulation of
the argument is convincing.
(ii) Coarse-grained versus fine-grained properties
The second way of reading the specific/general distinction is as
a distinction between coarse-grained and fine-grained proper-
ties. Consider a door painted in a specific shade of red (see
Kemmerer 2015: 7). This door has the property of being col-
oured: more specifically, it has the property of being red; more
specifically still, of being crimson; yet more specifically, of being
a very particular shade of crimson for which we have no word
(let us call it ‘crimson237’). Properties like being crimson237 are
extremely fine-grained properties whereas properties like being
coloured, being red, and being scarlet are more coarse-grained.
On this reading, Kemmerer’s argument is:
(1ii) We are only ever conscious of fine-grained properties.
(2ii) Conceptual content is always coarse-grained.
(C) So we are never conscious of concepts.
Both premises have some plausibility. Kemmerer remarks
that ‘[p]erhaps the most salient property of conscious states is
their extraordinary degree of differentiation’ (2015: 4). Concepts,
by contrast, ‘abstract away from all this diversity’ yielding more
‘wide-ranging, similarity based categories’ (2015: 4). One can
think about a door being red without having to attribute to it
any specific shade of red. Yet whenever one experiences the col-
our of a door one seems to experience it as having some ‘precise
shade of red’ (2015: 7). Similarly when one thinks of a triangle ‘it
must have three sides but need not have any particular size or
shape’ yet whenever we experience a triangle it appears to have
some specific size and shape (2015: 7). But despite its intuitive
appeal, this version of Kemmerer’s argument does not with-
stand scrutiny.
Regarding (1ii), there are some plausible counter-examples to
the claim that we are only ever conscious of extremely fine-
grained properties. The wealth of data surrounding ‘gist’ percep-
tion provides a case for thinking that coarse-grained properties
are consciously represented. For example, there is evidence that
we perceptually encode: the trustworthiness of a face (Todorov
et al. 2008); the average mood of a crowd (Haberman and
Whitney 2011); whether an object is an animal or a vehicle (Li
et al. 2002); and whether the perceived environment is a forest, a
beach, or an urban scene (Greene and Oliva 2009). In a similar
vein, Sperling’s (1960) research into the perceptual representa-
tion of briefly presented stimuli is sometimes taken to suggest
that conscious states with only coarse-grained content are possi-
ble. For example, Grush (2007) claims that when we are briefly
presented with an array of letters, we represent them as letters
without representing either the specific kinds of letters that they
are or their fine-grained shape [though see Block (2007) for objec-
tions to this interpretation]. We don’t take these findings to dem-
onstrate that coarse-grained properties are consciously
represented, but we do think that they undermine any entitle-
ment we might have for assuming that consciousness is limited
to fine-grained properties.
Regarding (2ii), although it is clear that many of our concepts
are coarse-grained, we are also capable of forming any number
of fine-grained concepts. For example, colour scientists and
paint manufacturers can presumably form concepts corre-
sponding to the most specific hues that human beings are able
to discriminate, such as <crimson237>. Indeed, given the appro-
priate theoretical scaffolding, one can presumably form con-
cepts referring to any perceptually given property. Of course,
these concepts cannot be applied to perceptual input in the way
that coarse-grained concepts can be, the colour scientist will be
able to apply the concept <red> directly and non-inferentially
whereas she will not be able to apply the concept <crimson237>
in that same way, for <red> is a recognitional concept whereas
<crimson237> is not.
In light of this objection, Kemmerer might try a modified
argument:
(1ii) We are only ever conscious of fine-grained properties.
(2ii*) Only coarse-grained concepts can be applied directly and
non-inferentially.
(C) So we are never conscious of concepts.
The problem with this version of the argument is that it
comes very close to begging the question against the liberal. We
can grant that <crimson237> cannot be applied to objects di-
rectly and non-inferentially, but what about <crimson> itself?
Isn’t this the kind of concept that can be directly and non-
inferentially applied to objects? Could it not be the kind of prop-
erty that enters into the contents of consciousness? We see little
prospect here of a persuasive objection to liberalism.
The objection from brain damage
Kemmerer’s second objection to liberalism concerns the impact
of certain kinds of brain damage on conscious experience. He
writes:
. . . it has been repeatedly shown that dysfunction of the ATLs due
to stroke, surgical resection, gradual deterioration or congenital
disease impairs the ability to recognize famous people like Bill
Clinton or Jennifer Aniston, but does not impair the ability to con-
sciously see their faces. . . . This dissociation greatly strengthens
the argument that whenever we see a familiar person, the rele-
vant concept cells in the ATLs play an essential role in allowing us
to identify them, but do not contribute directly to our conscious
experience. (2015: 4)
4 | McClelland and Bayne
 by guest on M
arch 11, 2016
http://nc.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
We are rather puzzled by this argument, for the impairment
that Kemmerer describes – prosopagnosia – seems to be clearly
an impairment of consciousness; indeed, it is surely an impair-
ment of visual experience. Individuals suffering from prosopag-
nosia can consciously recognize people on the basis of the
sound of their voice or the way that they walk, but they do not
recognize them visually. Of course, prosopagnosics can still
consciously see the faces of the people that they cannot recog-
nize, but that’s no objection to liberalism, for the liberal need
not hold that high-level content is essential to visual experience.
If the structure of Kemmerer’s argument were sound it would
also show that representations of colour or motion cannot be
part of the contents of visual experience, for individuals who
have suffered damage to ventral occipital cortex or posterior vi-
sual cortex still consciously see objects despite the fact that
they no longer experience their colour or motion. But this con-
clusion is obviously false, thus Kemmerer’s argument too must
be unsound.
The objection from viewer-invariance
Kemmerer’s third objection to liberalism is that it allows for
viewer-invariant representations, whereas:
. . . neither visual awareness nor any other form of awareness con-
tains viewer-invariant representations; on the contrary, possessing
a first-person perspective – one that, for sighted people, is typically
anchored behind the eyes – is often taken to be a fundamental re-
quirement of bodily self-consciousness. (2015: 10)
Here, Kemmerer is echoing an argument for conservatism pre-
viously made by Prinz (2011). In our view, it is doubly flawed.
Firstly, it seems evident that there are conscious viewpoint-
invariant representations. Consider the proposition <Paris is
north of New York City>. One can consciously entertain this
proposition without having any viewpoint on the state of affairs
that it represents. It might be argued that this proposition can-
not be entertained in phenomenal consciousness, but one
would need an argument for such a claim. Kemmerer’s concern
is not with entertaining propositions but with the question of
whether perceptual experience includes viewer-invariant repre-
sentations, but in order to count as an objection to liberalism
the argument needs to rule out the possibility of any kind of
viewer-invariant content, and even if Kemmerer is right that
perceptual representations are never viewpoint-invariant, this
hardly constitutes a reason to doubt that other kinds of con-
scious representation might have viewpoint-invariant content.
Of course, Kemmerer might flatly deny the existence of non-
perceptual conscious episodes such as entertaining a proposi-
tion but this would be to assume the very position that the argu-
ment is meant to motivate.
But what about perceptual experience – is it viewpoint in-
variant? Distinguish the question of whether perceptual experi-
ence is purely viewpoint invariant from the question of whether
it can contain viewpoint-invariant content. Following Prinz
(2011), Kemmerer seems to think that the liberal is committed
to the claim that it is possible to see (or indeed visually imagine)
a chair ‘from no vantage point’. But there is no more reason to
saddle the liberal with this commitment than there is to saddle
the conservative with the claim that low-level sensory proper-
ties such as colour, texture, or form can be experienced ‘from no
vantage point’. Just as conservatives will hold that redness can
be perceptually experienced only in the context of an egocentri-
cally anchored representation, so too the liberal might – and in
our view probably should – hold that chairness can be
perceptually experienced only in the context of a egocentrically
anchored representation. To represent something as a chair is
to represent it as possessing a viewpoint-invariant property, but
there is reason to think that representations of this property
can enter perceptual awareness only when bound to represen-
tations of the chair’s viewpoint-variant properties.
Real liberalism
In the course of assessing Kemmerer’s objections to liberalism,
we have suggested that he often misconstrues the liberal’s posi-
tion. Perhaps by setting the record straight on these issues we
can show liberalism in a more favourable light.
Two misconstruals appear to play a central role in motivat-
ing Kemmerer’s resistance to liberalism. First, Kemmerer seems
to assume that liberals are committed to the possibility of con-
scious states with exclusively conceptual content. Although
Kemmerer is in good company in making this assumption –
both Prinz (2011) and Pautz (2013) also endorse it – we see no
reason to saddle the liberal with any such commitment. It is
one thing to hold that conscious states can have contents that
are at least partly conceptual and quite another to hold that
conscious states can have purely conceptual content. (Compare:
‘some muffins contain blueberries’ with ‘some muffins are
made of nothing but blueberries’.) Although some liberals do in-
deed countenance conscious states that are purely conceptual,
others either reject that possibility or take no stance on this
issue.
This misconstrual of liberalism is at work in all three of
Kemmerer’s objections. Regarding generality, Kemmerer makes
the plausible claim that all conscious states have specific con-
tent, but he fails to recognize that they might simultaneously
have some general content. The existence of such general con-
tent is quite consistent with the impossibility of conscious
states with exclusively general content. Regarding brain dam-
age, Kemmerer rightly notes that those suffering from proso-
pagnosia can still experience faces, but he fails to recognize that
neurotypical subjects might enjoy conscious states that repre-
sent faces both non-conceptually and conceptually. The exis-
tence of such conceptual content is quite consistent with the
impossibility of consciously representing a face as Jennifer
Aniston without representing it as having any particular shape,
colour, or texture. Regarding viewer-invariance, Kemmerer
makes the plausible claim that all conscious states have viewer-
dependent content, but he fails to recognize that they might si-
multaneously have viewer-invariant content. The existence of
such viewer-invariant content is quite consistent with the im-
possibility of conscious states that involve no point of view at
all.
Second, Kemmerer sometimes talks as though liberals must
assume that conscious states are essentially imagistic. He ar-
gues against the possibility of experiencing triangularity on the
grounds that ‘no image could capture the conceptually vital fact
that . . . a triangle must have three sides but need not have any
particular shape or size’ (2015: 7). Similarly, he argues against
the possibility of consciously thinking that something is ‘taller
than Tom’ on the grounds that no mental image of Tom and the
object ‘ . . . would be able to indicate, in a purely visual, non-
symbolic fashion, that what’s really important is the relative
height of the two objects’ (2015: 5).
Kemmerer may well be right about the limitations of imagis-
tic representation here but he is wrong to saddle liberals with
the assumption that all conscious content is imagistic. We
know of no liberal who holds an imagistic view of thought, nor
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do we know of any reason to think that liberals ought to hold
such a view. When liberals claim that we can be conscious of
triangularity, or that we can consciously entertain the proposi-
tion that no object is taller than Tom, they are positing the exis-
tence of non-imagistic experiences.
Three Theories of Consciousness
In the previous section, we argued that Kemmerer’s objections
to liberalism are unpersuasive. Here we put those issues to one
side in order to examine Kemmerer’s claims concerning the im-
plications of conservatism for the assessment of three influen-
tial theories of consciousness. But before we consider the
details of these accounts, we want first to draw attention to the
distinction between a theory of consciousness as-it-is-
formulated-by-its-leading-advocates and the essential core of
the theory itself. There is a difference between (say) a global
neuronal workspace theorist making some claim about con-
sciousness and that claim actually being entailed by the essen-
tial core of that theory, and even where an advocate of a theory
takes some claim to be entailed by the essential core of that the-
ory, we don’t necessarily have to agree with them. This distinc-
tion is important, for the leading advocates of a certain theory
of consciousness might be committed to a particular account of
the admissible contents of consciousness without that account
being entailed by the relevant theory. It is one thing for the lead-
ing advocates of the Global Neuronal Workspace Theory
(GNWT) (for example) to assume liberalism and quite another
for GNWT itself to be essentially liberal. The central question, of
course, concerns the essential commitments of a theory of
consciousness.
Global Neuronal Workspace Theory
We begin with the GNWT of consciousness (Baars 1989;
Dehaene and Naccache 2001; Dehaene and Changeux 2011). We
take the GNWT to consist in the claim that representations are
conscious when and only when they occur within the global
neuronal workspace – an information integrating and broad-
casting network that is implemented by brain circuits that are
predominantly located in the prefrontal and parietal lobes. The
critical questions here are:
a. Do thoughts/concepts enter the global workspace?
b. If thoughts/concepts enter the global workspace, do they
thereby figure in phenomenal consciousness?
c. If thoughts/concepts in the global workspace figure in phe-
nomenal consciousness, do they do so directly or indirectly?
Regarding (a), it is very plausible that thoughts and concepts
do indeed enter the global workspace. As discussed, we evi-
dently have access to at least some of our occurrent thoughts
and perceptual conceptual classifications. The contents to
which we have access are precisely those contents that have
entered the global workspace, thus concepts must enter the
global workspace. This tallies with the passages from
Dehaene’s work cited by Kemmerer. Dehaene clearly counte-
nances conscious thoughts, and his description of the percep-
tual experience of looking at Da Vinci’s Mona Lisa (2014: 177–179)
suggests that he takes concepts to also feature in perception.
There are, however, theorists who deny that thoughts can
enter the global workspace, such as Peter Carruthers.
Carruthers (2015) argues that global broadcasting is achieved by
attention, and that because attention can be directed only at
midlevel sensory areas, nonsensory thoughts cannot enter the
global workspace. Carruthers does not exclude all conceptual
content from the global workspace – he holds that concepts can
be globally broadcast insofar as they are suitably bound to sen-
sory contents in the form of high-level perception or sensorily
embedded thoughts – but he certainly denies that nonsensory
thoughts are ever conscious. Although Carruthers’ treatment
of conscious thought is highly counter-intuitive (as he himself
acknowledges), its tenability indicates that it is an open ques-
tion whether GNWT does indeed entail a liberal view of
consciousness.
What about (b)? Is the GNWT intended as a theory of phenom-
enal consciousness, or is its target access consciousness? Taking
GNWT to be a theory of only access consciousness would still
render it incompatible with a radical form of conservatism that
denies we are conscious of concepts in any sense, but it would
be quite compatible with more moderate forms of conservatism
that preclude only concepts from directly figuring in phenome-
nal consciousness.
It is not entirely clear whether Dehaene advances GNWT as
a theory of phenomenal consciousness. On the one hand, he
emphasizes that GNWT is an account of conscious access, and
refrains from using the terms ‘phenomenal consciousness’,
‘qualia’, and the like. At the same time, Dehaene does claim
that the ‘ . . . global availability of information is precisely what
we subjectively experience as a conscious state’ (2014: 4), and
talk of ‘subjective experience’ certainly suggests that he has
phenomenal consciousness in mind. Dehaene’s worry may not
be with the notion of phenomenal consciousness as such but
with ‘the notion of a phenomenal consciousness that is distinct
from conscious access’, a notion that he describes as ‘highly
misleading’ (2014: 10).
It is, of course, controversial whether Dehaene is right to as-
sume that phenomenal consciousness necessarily involves con-
scious access, for there are those who argue that we should take
seriously the possibility that we have phenomenal states to
which we lack ‘conscious access’ (e.g. Block 2007, 2011). But the
more relevant issue here is not whether phenomenal con-
sciousness entails conscious access but whether conscious ac-
cess entails phenomenal consciousness. Kemmerer himself
expresses doubts about the possibility of access consciousness
and phenomenal consciousness coming apart (2015: 5), but
many of his fellow-conservatives assume that content can be
access conscious without being phenomenally conscious. We
conclude that the answer to (b) should be left open for now: it is
not clear whether all advocates of GNWT take it to be a theory
of phenomenal consciousness, and it is even less clear that
doing so ought to be regarded as an essential feature of the ac-
count. (That said, there is little substance to the GNWT if it is
merely regarded as a theory of access consciousness, for it’s al-
most tautological to claim that access conscious information
must be contained within a global workspace. Arguably the em-
pirical content of the GNWT when understood as a theory of ac-
cess consciousness is largely limited to its neuronal
components.)
What about (c)? According to the indirect view, thoughts are
conscious in virtue of the fact that they are carried by/embed-
ded in some sensory state, such that the thought and the sen-
sory state form some kind of composite. Prinz, for example,
suggests we should ‘ . . . allow conscious concepts and thoughts
as long as they are encoded in sensory vehicles and have no
qualities above and beyond their sensory qualities.’ (2011: 177).
On this view, consciously thinking that Bert is taller than Ernie
might involve some kind of visual image of seeing Bert as taller
than Ernie, or perhaps it might involve an inner utterance with
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the meaning ‘Bert is taller than Ernie’ (Prinz 2011). Here,
thoughts would indeed occur within a global workspace, but
they would not have any intrinsic phenomenology. Instead, they
would enter consciousness in virtue of the fact that they are
‘clothed in’ or ‘carried by’ sensory qualities. This view is neatly
captured in the passage from Jackendoff discussed earlier and is
endorsed by many conservatives.
But is GNWT consistent with this account of how concepts
figure in phenomenal consciousness? We suggest that GNWT
does not complement the indirect view. Putting aside worries
about question (a), it’s plausible that concepts enter the global
workspace. And if we interpret the GNWT as an account of phe-
nomenal consciousness, then it predicts that all contents in the
global workspace will be phenomenally conscious. Since con-
cepts can figure in phenomenal consciousness directly, there’s
no need for them to be ‘carried’ by sensory content.
Again though, this natural reading of GNWT is not beyond
reproach. Carruthers claims that ‘[c]oncepts can be constitutive
components of globally broadcast perceptual states while mak-
ing only a causal contribution to the phenomenal properties of
those states’ (2015: 73). On this view, both sensory content and
(certain kinds of) conceptual content enter the global work-
space, but only sensory content becomes phenomenal.
Conceptual content can show up in our phenomenology, but
only by indirectly influencing the sensory content of our
experience.
As before, Carruthers’ position is not one we would endorse.
As far as we can tell, he has no explanation for why sensory
content figures in phenomenal consciousness directly while
conceptual content does not. Indeed, his position seems to be
driven by a prior commitment to conservatism rather than by
any theoretical considerations. It is worth noting though that
here we find yet another obstacle to Kemmerer’s conclusion
that GNWT is committed to liberalism, albeit an obstacle we
suspect can be overcome.
In summary, the question of whether GNWT is committed
to liberalism is significantly more complex than Kemmerer’s
discussion might lead one to think. GNWT is hard to square
with a radical conservativism, but the considerations raised
show that more needs to be done to rule out the possibility of
GNWT being consistent with a moderate conservativism.
Specifically, one would have to address doubts about: (a)
whether non-sensory thoughts can enter the global workspace;
(b) whether GNWT entails that concepts/thoughts entering the
global workspace thereby figure in phenomenal consciousness;
and (c) whether GNWT entails that concepts/thoughts that fig-
ure in phenomenal consciousness do so directly.
Integrated Information Theory
Kemmerer suggests that Integrated Information Theory (IIT) en-
tails a ‘ . . . strong endorsement of the liberal view that concepts
are conscious when activated’ (p. 7). Some of the questions
raised by this assessment are easily addressed. We noted that it
is something of an open question whether Dehaene’s concern
is with phenomenal consciousness, but there is no parallel
question here, for Tononi is explicitly concerned with phenom-
enology (e.g. 2012: 317): ‘what it’s like’ for a subject (e.g. 2012:
306); qualia (e.g. 2012: 298); and experience (e.g. 2012: 295).
Furthermore, this is clearly integral to IIT and not a quirk of
Tononi’s exposition. IIT is specifically constructed to address
phenomenological data (see especially Tononi 2012: 296–298)
and is not plausibly restricted to access consciousness.
So IIT is clearly intended as an account of phenomenal con-
sciousness, but what conception of phenomenal consciousness
does it bring with it? Is it committed to liberalism? To conserva-
tism? Or can it be developed in either conservative or liberal
directions?
Tononi himself seems to be committed to a liberal con-
ception of consciousness, for there are a number of passages
in his work in which he refers to concepts being conscious.
However, as Kemmerer points out (2015: 6), Tononi uses the
term ‘concept’ idiosyncratically: according to Tononi, any el-
ement of the contents of consciousness is a ‘concept’. That
said, it is clear that at least some of the so-called ‘concepts’
that Tononi and his co-authors take to figure in conscious-
ness are genuinely conceptual. For example, Tononi and
Koch (2015: 9) claim that we consciously represent the prop-
erty of ‘being Jennifer Aniston’, and Tononi (2012: 302) claims
that we consciously represent objects as tables. Tononi also
talks about invariant properties (2012: 318) and the meaning
of linguistic utterances (2015) figuring in the contents of con-
sciousness. In all these cases, it is natural to assume that
mental representation of such properties would be concep-
tual. Of course, these textual observations only tell us that
the advocates of IIT endorse liberalism. Our real concern
should be with whether this is an essential commitment of
the theory itself.
Although the issue is ultimately an empirical one, we sus-
pect that IIT is likely to end up being committed to liberalism.
For IIT, the key marker of consciousness is the extent to which
information in a system is integrated, which is understood as
the extent to which information generated by the whole system
is irreducible to information generated by its sub-systems
(Tononi 2012: 297). The ‘phi’ measure is designed to capture the
degree to which ‘ . . . the cause–effect structure specified by a
system’s mechanisms changes if the system is partitioned
along its minimum partition . . . ’ (Tononi and Koch 2015: 8).
There is nothing to suggest that only sensory states can have a
degree of phi greater than 0, and indeed it seems highly likely
that conceptual structures will display relatively high degrees of
phi. In addition to informational integration IIT also places
other constraints on consciousness – for example, it requires
conscious systems to have a differentiated cause–effect reper-
toire (Tononi and Koch 2015: 7) – but as far as we can tell none
of these additional constraints rules out the possibility of con-
cepts entering consciousness.
If concepts/thoughts do display informational integration,
might IIT make the moderate conservative prediction that they
only figure in phenomenal consciousness indirectly? This
doesn’t seem likely, for as best we can tell there is nothing in
the constraints that IIT places on consciousness to indicate that
all phenomenal content must be carried by sensory content. So
assuming conceptual information does indeed satisfy these
conditions, IIT would be committed to the liberal conclusion
that concepts figure in phenomenal consciousness directly.
Attended Intermediate Representation Theory
Kemmerer argues that ‘ . . . because the AIRT adopts the con-
servative view that concepts never reach awareness, it may
have a significant advantage over both the GNWT and the IIT’
(2015: 8). The claim that Prinz and his theory are committed to
conservatism is indisputable for there is no question of where
Prinz stands on the admissibility debate: he is an explicit and
vocal supporter of conservatism. Nor is there any question
about whether conservatism follows from his account of
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consciousness: Attended Intermediate Representation Theory
(AIRT) is essentially conservative because the ‘I’ in ‘AIRT’
stands for the claim that only intermediate-level representa-
tions – that is, non-conceptual viewpoint-dependent sensory
representations – can figure in the contents of (phenomenal)
consciousness.
Kemmerer is right that AIRT is a conservative theory of con-
sciousness, but does this provide an argument in its favour? We
think not, even if conservatism turns out to be true. The central prob-
lem here is that AIRT entails conservatism only by stipulation. The
key theoretical claim behind AIRT is that ‘[a]ttention . . . is neces-
sary and sufficient for consciousness’ (2012: 89). The truth of con-
servatism would provide a good argument for AIRT if
conservatism followed from the claim that attention is necessary
and sufficient for consciousness, for in that case AIRT would ex-
plain why conservatism was true, and the ‘I’ in AIRT would be re-
dundant. But as far as we can see conservatism wouldn’t follow
from the claim that attention was necessary and sufficient for
consciousness, for it is plausible that states other than intermedi-
ate-level representations can be modulated by attention. Hence
AIRT entails conservatism only because conservatism is explicitly
stipulated by it.
In case this point remains obscure, consider a version of
GNWT which includes the stipulation that only intermediate-level
representations can enter the global workspace. This version of
the global workspace theory would be explicitly conservative, but
it would be preposterous to say that it would be supported by the
truth of conservatism. The fundamental point here is that an ac-
count of the admissible contents of consciousness provides a rea-
son to favour a theory of consciousness only if that theory explains
why the contents of consciousness are constrained in the ways
that they are. AIRT’s claim that only states modulated by attention
are conscious does not provide such an explanation, for that view
is consistent with concepts and indeed thoughts figuring in the
contents of consciousness.
Concluding comments: Modus Tollens or
Modus Ponens?
We bring our discussion to a close by considering an issue that
frames Kemmerer’s paper as a whole: how can we use an ac-
count of the admissible contents of consciousness to guide the
evaluation of theories of consciousness?
In using his defence of conservatism as a reason to reject
both the GNWT and IIT accounts of consciousness Kemmerer
argues as follows:
1. Concepts/thoughts cannot figure in the contents of
consciousness.
2. If GNWT/IIT were true then concepts/thoughts would be
able to figure in the contents of consciousness.
3. So both GNWT and IIT are false.
This argument is valid but it is not dialectically compelling,
for the case in favour of conservatism is far from conclusive –
indeed, it is highly controversial. In light of this, advocates of
the theories of consciousness that the argument targets might
attempt to turn the argument on its head and argue as follows:
1. GNWT/IIT is true.
2. If GNWT/IIT is true then conservatism is false.
3. So, conservatism is false.
Thus, even if Kemmerer is right that both GNWT and IIT
are committed to liberalism, this needn’t compel advocates
of those theories to abandon their views, but can instead be
regarded as a reason for them to advocate liberalism. In the
jargon of philosophy, the advocates of these views would be
within their rights to ‘modus ponens’ Kemmerer’s modus
tollens.
The fundamental point that emerges from the foregoing is
that one’s account of the admissible contents of consciousness
must be consistent with one’s theory of consciousness. Arguably,
the method to be adopted here is that of reflective equilibrium:
rather than privileging one set of claims over another, we
should instead attempt to bring the most plausible account of
what makes a mental state conscious into alignment with the
most plausible account of what kinds of mental states can be
conscious. Of course, theorists will have their own views as to
what the most plausible views on the table here are (and thus
reflective equilibrium may not lead to consensus), but all theo-
rists should recognize that accounts of consciousness and ac-
counts of the admissible contents of consciousness should not
be considered in isolation from each other.
Although we have disagreed with Kemmerer on many
points, we are in deep agreement with his claim that the ques-
tion of whether concepts and thoughts ever reach awareness is
an important one for the science of consciousness, and one that
the science of consciousness ignores at its peril. In this regard,
we hope that his paper receives the widespread attention that it
deserves.
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